“Justice and liberty are not the subjects of bargaining and barter.” (Shelton v. United States (5th Cir. 1957) 246 F.2d 571, 579.) This noble statement is simply not true: 90% of all convictions in the United States are obtained by plea bargain, rather than by trial. The system of plea bargaining, therefore, has almost overwhelmed the system of trial by jury, and we must be constantly aware of how it may go wrong. Specifically, we should guard against conflicts of interest on the part of the lawyers that my produce unjust outcomes for victims and defendants.
Lawyers’ self-interest can skew the outcomes of plea bargaining. On the defense side, a public defender may be, and in some places always is, overworked. A new case may come in for arraignment that would contribute significantly to the attorney’s workload. In that situation, the defense attorney may recommend a quick plea bargain to dispose of the case. This might not even be a bad thing. When the public defender is dumping this case in order to focus on her more significant cases, the defendant in those significant cases may benefit. In this way, the public defender is exercising something like prosecutorial discretion. It is not controversial, after all, for a prosecutor to refuse to file a relatively unimportant case because her energies are already spent on other more important cases. Defense lawyers do not have this formal power, but if they are willing to accept bad plea deals, they have this power in practice. I have even seen this in action, especially in misdemeanor courts. In this situation, the defendant loses his right to aggressive representation on his behalf.
Prosecutors, in turn, may be motivated to make unnecessarily lenient plea offers. Even the best criminal code is written in general language, and there are often problems in application to individual cases. As Albert W. Alschuler has said, “individual prosecutors may be influenced […] by a desire to smooth out the irrationalities of the criminal code.” (Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining (1968) 36 U. Chi. L.Rev. 50, 71-79.) Prosecutors may be faced with weak cases that they still believe in. For example, if a prosecutor believes she can prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt but feels that it is very unlikely, she may plea bargain to ensure a conviction, regardless of whether the punishment is too lenient. Better something than nothing, after all. Prosecutors may plea bargain to avoid harsh minimum sentences. They may also plea bargain to protect victims who do not wish to testify. None of these motivations would constitute a conflict of interest.
But there are other, less reputable reasons why prosecutors may plea bargain where conflict of interest rears its ugly head. Prosecutors are often evaluated on their performance by looking at their trial statistics. More guilty verdicts are better, obviously, than hung juries or acquittals. Ambitious prosecutors, and we are all ambitious, pay attention to this record more than any other measure of performance. When a difficult case comes along, this type of evaluation puts prosecutors in a tough position. The prosecutor may feel that the defendant deserves a particular sentence. Let’s say 20 years, for example. But she knows that the case is difficult to prove, and that juries are unpredictable. If the defendant is willing to take 10 years, a prosecutor may be tempted to agree to this to preserve her trial record. After all, if she takes the case to trial because she doesn’t feel that 10 years is a punishment that fits the crime, she risks a loss on her record. A loss that would be held against her when her performance is evaluated. How much more important is justice (that the punishment fit the crime) than the prosecutor’s career? It’s a question that shouldn’t have to be asked, but that I’m sure is asked all the time.
The problem of conflict of interest during plea bargaining is particularly acute with private defense attorneys. It may even be in a private defense attorney’s self-interest to recommend rejection of a favorable plea agreement. For example, if a private defense attorney bills by the hour, his economic self-interest would be to spend as many hours on the case as possible. A favorable offer at the beginning of the case would nip that opportunity in the bud. A private defense lawyer may run into the same problem if they are charging by the motion, if they are able to charge more for a writ, for a habeas corpus proceeding, or to handle an appeal. Private lawyers may even want the practice of conducting a trial, to improve their trial skills, regardless of the potential consequences for their clients. On the other hand, many private attorneys are paid a flat fee to take a criminal case, regardless of whether they dispose of it quickly or take it to trial. It’s much easier to take the fee and take the plea than to prepare a complex trial.
Plea bargaining will continue until more lawyers are hired or less cases are filed. Many people feel that the current situation cries out for reform. When someone’s freedom is at state, it pays to do things right.